Tamils debate: What went wrong?

Thirty eight years ago, in June 1971, a small group of Tamil youths headed by Nadarajah Thangavelu, known as Thangathurai and Selvarajah Yogachandran ( Kuttimani) tried to answer the question: Why did the JVP insurrection fail? The JVP revolt which began on April 5 had failed in three weeks.
The discussion took place in the spacious residence of a Tamil academic in Point Pedro and the other members of the group were: Periya (Big) Sothi, Sinna (Small) Sothi, Chellaiah Thanabalasingham (Chetti), Kannadi, Vaithilingam Nadesuthasan, Sri Sabaratnam and Velupillai Pirapaharan. Pirapaharan, then 17 years, was the youngest.

During the four weeks I was sick two matters concerning the future of the Sri Lankan Tamils were intensely debated. The Sinhalese debated the suitability of the 13th Amendment and the Tamils, mainly disapora, tried to find answers to the questions: ‘What went wrong with the armed struggle?’ and ‘Why India played the role it played?’

Thirty eight years ago, in June 1971, a small group of Tamil youths headed by Nadarajah Thangavelu, known as Thangathurai and Selvarajah Yogachandran ( Kuttimani) tried to answer the question: Why did the JVP insurrection fail? The JVP revolt which began on April 5 had failed in three weeks.

The discussion took place in the spacious residence of a Tamil academic in Point Pedro and the other members of the group were: Periya (Big) Sothi, Sinna (Small) Sothi, Chellaiah Thanabalasingham (Chetti), Kannadi, Vaithilingam Nadesuthasan, Sri Sabaratnam and Velupillai Pirapaharan. Pirapaharan, then 17 years, was the youngest.
That unnamed group met regularly since late 1969 and were engaged in political discussions and in manufacturing revolvers and bombs. Their discussion was about starting armed struggle. They analysed previous examples: Russian and French revolutions and the experiences of Vietnam, Yugoslavia, China and the then ongoing

East Pakistan freedom struggle. They also had shooting practice.
The group decided the JVP insurrection failed because the cadres were ill- trained, ill equipped, badly led and tried to hold territory. What the JVP did was to get groups of 25 to 30 youths armed with home- made patrol bombs and grenades to surround the police stations on all sides and attack them. They captured about 93 of the island’s 273 police stations and when the police returned with the army they fled.

Thangathurai told me in his interview in 1982 they analysed the East Pakistan (Bangladesh in late 1971) and noted that that would not apply to the conditions in the northeastern Sri Lanka. “There the Bengali officers in the Pakistani army played an important role and we had no significant number of Tamils in the Sri Lankan army,” he said. In the Bangladeshi liberation Bengali soldiers and militant groups played sabotaged Pakistani administration.

The group also noted the factors which motivated the people. JVP depended on discrimination- ‘coconut milk for us’ slogan- and Indian expansionism. Bangladesh freedom fighters depended on discrimination and Bengali nationalism. Yogoslav, Vietnam and Chinese revolutions whipped up nationalism.

Thangathurai told me that they group decided in favour of the JVP model with stress on Tamil nationalism and sustained guerrilla warfare. Pirapaharan who was influenced by those discussions formed a secret group a few months later and named it Tamil New Tigers. It was renamed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on July 5, 1976.
Now, to the debate: What went wrong with the LTTE? The causes for Pirapaharan’s failure are being analyzed by the Tamils and the revolutionary movements worldwide. Tamil intellectuals and political analysts have identified the following causes:
* Change in the international situation after 11/9.
* The Indian factor, and
* Pirapaharan’s decision to hold on to land and people.
The assessment made by the Communist Party of India (Maoists) touches on these factors. It says:

“The experience of LTTE’s setback in Sri Lanka is very important for us to study and take lessons. The mistake of the LTTE lay in its lack of study of the changes of the enemy tactics, capabilities, international support and open assistance by imperialist powers and an underestimation of the enemy along with an overestimation of its own forces and capabilities.”

The three factors highlighted above played more or less equal role in causing LTTE’s defeat. The international scene turned against the LTTE after the Al Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2002. Former US President Bush’s war against terrorism turned the entire world against the LTTE. The ban which was limited earlier became almost worldwide.
The ban affected LTTE’s weapon procurement; it made it impossible to buy ant- aircraft weapons. It had no answer to air strikes, multi barrels and heavy artilleries.

The LTTE made some efforts to win international support but failed. Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) in a statement accepted that. He said all their efforts to move the western nation were unsuccessful.

The Indian factor has to be dealt in detail. We will look at it next week.
The decision to hold territory and people despite army’s manpower and firepower superiority is considered by analysts a fatal mistake. They argue that his decision to withdraw his fighters from the east was an error. They say he should have returned to guerrilla warfare in the east while defending Vanni.
Here the Maoist assessment seems appropriate. According to it the LTTE failed to take into account army’s new tactics, especially its guerilla warfare strategy. Over estimation of its capabilities had been the bane of the LTTE. They believed in their own propaganda: We defeated the world’s strongest army. They thought the miracle of driving army from Vanni would recur.

Tamils are now shifting towards the democratic mode to advance their struggle to win their rights. They want to build on the sympathy and goodwill LTTE’s defeat had created among world nations.

The participation of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in the July 2 inaugural meeting of the Development and Reconciliation Committee convened by President Mahinda Rajapaksa is a welcome pointer. The participation of the UNP is also a healthy sign.

President Rajapaksa is now in a strong position. He wields the support of almost the entire Sinhalese people. He had also brought in the National Freedom Front headed by JVP rebel Wimal Weerawansa into the government and strengthened himself further. It is opportune time for him to rebuild the nation and prevent the recurrence of the Tamil freedom struggle.

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